If you are wondering whether someone running your retirement plan had a conflict of interest, here is the short answer. Under ERISA, a conflict exists when a person with control over the plan or its money stands to gain from a decision that may not serve participants. The law answers that risk with a strict duty of loyalty and a list of banned transactions.
Perhaps you noticed a fund on your 401(k) menu run by the same company that keeps the accounts. Perhaps a fee line on your statement does not add up, or you read that participants sued over your employer's plan. Each of those is a question about whose interest a plan decision served. ERISA answers that question with rules, and the plan's own public filings show much of the record those rules are applied to.
What a Conflict of Interest Means for Your Plan
Before deciding whether something in your plan looks wrong, it helps to know who ERISA holds to its duties. The answer is the fiduciary: a person who controls the plan or its money and must act only in the participants' interest. Under 29 U.S.C. § 1002(21)(A), a person is a fiduciary to the extent it exercises discretionary authority or control over plan management or plan assets, has discretionary responsibility for plan administration, or renders investment advice for a fee.
That test is functional. A recordkeeper (the company that keeps the accounts and runs the website), an adviser or a fund manager may be a fiduciary for one act and not for another. The label in a contract does not settle it; what the person actually does does.
A conflict arises when the fiduciary's own financial interest points one way and the participants' interest points another. Conflicts are common in financial services, where the same firm may sell funds, keep records and give advice. ERISA was written with that in mind.
There is a real difference between a conflict that is disclosed and managed through a careful, independent process and one that is concealed or acted on. The first may be lawful. The second is where the statute's protections come into play.
The Fiduciary Duties That Answer a Conflict
When you ask whether a plan decision was made for you or for someone else, the governing text is 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1). It requires a fiduciary to discharge its duties "solely in the interest of the participants and beneficiaries," and then sets out four duties:
- Loyalty, § 1104(a)(1)(A): act "for the exclusive purpose of: (i) providing benefits to participants and their beneficiaries; and (ii) defraying reasonable expenses of administering the plan."
- Prudence, § 1104(a)(1)(B): act "with the care, skill, prudence, and diligence under the circumstances then prevailing that a prudent man acting in a like capacity and familiar with such matters would use."
- Diversification, § 1104(a)(1)(C): diversify plan investments "so as to minimize the risk of large losses, unless under the circumstances it is clearly prudent not to do so."
- Following the plan documents, § 1104(a)(1)(D): act in accordance with them insofar as they are consistent with ERISA.
The duty of loyalty is the anti-conflict rule. A fiduciary who benefits personally from a plan decision may be breaching it, even if the decision also had some benefit for participants. "Solely in the interest" is a demanding phrase. It asks more than the ordinary corporate standard, under which a director may balance several interests. An ERISA fiduciary's loyalty runs to participants alone.
Prudence is judged mostly by process: what the fiduciaries reviewed, what alternatives they weighed, and why they chose as they did. A broader treatment of these duties appears in our page on ERISA fiduciary breach.
Prohibited Transactions: When a Conflict Becomes a Violation
Some dealings involving your plan are banned outright, whatever the motive. These are prohibited transactions, set out in 29 U.S.C. § 1106.
Section 1106(a) covers dealings between the plan and a "party in interest." Under 29 U.S.C. § 1002(14), that term includes plan fiduciaries, people who provide services to the plan, the employer whose employees are covered, employee organizations, and certain relatives and affiliates. Except as § 1108 provides, a fiduciary "shall not cause the plan to engage in a transaction, if he knows or should know" that it is a direct or indirect:
- sale, exchange or lease of property between the plan and a party in interest;
- loan or other extension of credit between them;
- furnishing of goods, services or facilities between them;
- transfer to, or use by or for the benefit of, a party in interest of any plan assets; or
- acquisition of employer securities or employer real property in violation of § 1107(a).
Section 1106(b) targets self-dealing. A fiduciary may not deal with plan assets "in his own interest or for his own account," act for a party whose interests are adverse to the plan or its participants, or "receive any consideration for his own personal account from any party dealing with such plan in connection with a transaction involving the assets of the plan."
Exemptions exist. Section 1108 sets out statutory exemptions, including reasonable compensation for necessary services and, under specific conditions, loans to participants. The Department of Labor may also grant administrative prohibited transaction exemptions. Its rules on fiduciary investment advice, including the rulemaking known as the Retirement Security Rule, have been the subject of litigation and revision, so their current state is something to confirm rather than assume. More detail is on our page about ERISA prohibited transactions.
Conflict Patterns Participants Have Raised in Court
If something about your plan seemed familiar in the news, it may be one of the patterns below. Each has appeared in ERISA complaints. Each is an allegation that participants have made, not a finding about any plan, and a lawsuit's filing establishes nothing about what happened.
Revenue sharing. This is a fund paying part of its fee to the recordkeeper. Participants have alleged that such payments influenced which funds appeared on the menu, or that the recordkeeper's total pay grew without anyone checking it. Our page on 401(k) recordkeeping fees explains how those charges work.
Proprietary fund menus. When the plan sponsor (the employer that set up the plan) is itself a financial institution, its own funds may fill the lineup. Participants have alleged that affiliated funds carried higher fees or weaker performance than available alternatives.
Bundled services. One provider may handle recordkeeping, investment management and administration together. Complaints have alleged that bundling created incentives to favor the provider's own products.
Employer stock. Participants have alleged that heavy concentration in company stock reflected the employer's interest in its share price rather than participants' interest in diversification.
Paid advice. An adviser who earns more from one product than another faces a structural incentive, which is why § 1106(b) and the § 1108(g) advice-arrangement conditions address how advisers are paid.
